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“Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much”: The essential role 
of EU agencies in combatting the sale of counterfeit goods 
 
 
Abstract 
This article demonstrates the role and importance of EU agencies in the EU’s regulatory 
environment, and considers the consequences of an absence of cooperation through agencies 
for internal security. It does so by exploring the case study of the anti-counterfeiting activities 
of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), and what happens when a state 
no longer benefits from membership of an EU agency. The effective protection of consumers 
from counterfeit goods is dependent upon identifying best practices, sharing information on 
counterfeiting trends, and coordinating responses, activities undertaken through EU 
agencies. This article demonstrates that the ability of states to effectively counter the sale of 
counterfeit goods is dependent upon the existence of EU agencies due to the need for 
transnational cooperation. In the absence of EU agencies, states are likely to suffer 
diminished operational expertise and a lack of in-depth knowledge concerning counterfeiting 
trends. It concludes that the EU agencies form an essential part of EU security governance, 
with states not party to these cooperative endeavours rendered vulnerable and unable to 
combat at a national level what is ultimately a global problem.  
 
1. Introduction 
In June 2017, as part of a coordinated action comprising Europol, the European Union 
Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, OLAF, the EU’s anti-fraud agency, and the 
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), with Europol’s Intellectual Property 
Crime Coordinated Coalition (IPC3) taking the lead, more than 122 tonnes of potentially 
lethal counterfeit pesticides were seized as part of Operation Silver Axe II (Europol 2017).  
Cooperation between these EU agencies and national authorities was deemed by Europol to 
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be ‘crucial to the success of the action’ (Europol 2017), dependent upon close coordination, 
knowledge-sharing and data exchange, without which the operation would not have been a 
success (Megget 2017). Without effective information sharing and data analysis between 
states, real risks to human health are posed by counterfeit products. One example of this is 
the 2013 ‘horsemeat’ scandal, in which mislabelled meat products originating in Romania, 
advertised as containing beef, actually constituted horse and pig meat not intended for human 
consumption that was sold by supermarkets in the UK (Stones 2014). Countering these 
threats in globalised and transnational supply chains requires cooperation between national 
authorities, law enforcement and the private sector.  In the EU, the facilitation of cross-border 
activity in a wealth of different sectors has been achieved through the creation of specialised 
agencies that act as coordination and information gathering entities, making otherwise 
infeasible actions possible.  Furthermore, these agencies have been typified by task and 
competence expansion, including becoming integral components of EU policy-making and 
activity implementation (Egeberg, Trondal, and Vestlund 2015), and their functions essential 
in fields typified by cross-border activity where solely national action is ineffective. Yet what 
happens to a state party to such a system of knowledge and information sharing when it loses 
access to such an agency? 
  
This article aims to demonstrate that when combatting complex security threats, such as those 
posed by the sale of counterfeit goods, the role of EU agencies in serving as centres of 
coordination, cooperation and operational expertise is absolutely essential to effective 
security governance. Counterfeiting, as will be discussed in this paper, is a type of offence 
that takes advantage of highly distributed global supply chains and trade routes to hide the 
origin of fake goods, presenting states with a transnational threat that cannot be faced on an 
individual basis. In particular, it shows that a harmonisation of the laws applicable to 
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intellectual property protection in the context of the internal market and Customs Union has 
not been sufficient in ensuring effective control of the counterfeit goods trade, but that the 
development of EU agencies tasked with implementing anti-counterfeiting policies in the 
context of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has been vital.  In order to 
demonstrate the importance of these agencies in dealing with complex transnational threats, 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (‘Brexit’) is used to provide an example of what happens 
in the absence of these forms of agency cooperation. It must be stated at this point that Brexit 
is in no way guaranteed, nor is the form of any agreement (or absence of one) definitive at 
this point in time.  It does, however, provide an opportunity to consider the implications of 
losing access to well-established bodies such as EU agencies, both for the state losing access, 
as well as for the EU in securing its aims. It is also intended that the article make a broader 
contribution to the understanding of the role of the EU’s agencies and agencification, beyond 
the immediate security example, as a means of facilitating access to the knowledge, 
coordination abilities and expertise required to provide effective regulation in areas of high 
technical complexity. While there have been considerable efforts dedicated to understanding 
the creation and role of these agencies as well as their legal forms and the effectiveness of 
their activities, there is a dearth of literature considering what happens when a Member State 
loses access to the operational expertise developed over a significant period of time, 
particularly in contexts involving cross-border activities and information that national 
authorities by their nature lack. This article seeks to demonstrate the importance of the 
agency responsible for the registration and protection of EU intellectual property, the 
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and its European Observatory on 
Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights (the European Observatory) in capacity-
building, data collection, and the sharing of information and best practices as part of a 
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concerted anti-counterfeiting system.  Additionally, it assesses the risks posed by its potential 
loss, an issue that has not yet been considered in the academic literature. 
 
This article will begin by exploring the role of EU agencies in more detail, highlighting the 
importance of these agencies as sources of knowledge, expertise and collaboration between a 
variety of public and private actors. The article will continue by applying this framework to 
the establishment of the European Observatory, demonstrating the importance of this sub-
division of the EUIPO agency in the effective enforcement of EU anti-counterfeiting laws 
and policies, linking EU agency functions to effective anti-counterfeiting actions. Finally, 
this article will consider the impact of the UK decision to withdraw from the EU in terms of 
the effects upon UK capabilities to effectively police the import of counterfeit goods as an 
example of the extent to which Member States rely upon these agencies. It will conclude by 
drawing conclusions on the vital role of EU agencies in effective security governance, and 
how the reliance on these agencies means that in their absence, states are rendered 
vulnerable. Regulatory convergence in the absence of multilevel networks facilitated through 
EU agencies is insufficient for dealing with complex problems such as those posed by 
counterfeit goods. 
 
2: EU Agencies, Expertise and Knowledge 
 
Since the reforms of the 1980s, motivated by the political and economic ideas concerning the 
role of the state, we have seen waves of market deregulation, market liberalisation and 
privatisation of state activities, which has been referred to as a process of state shrinkage. 
Instead, however, it is perhaps more accurate to think of the process as one of state 
transformation, to one of the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994), or in the case of the EU, from 
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the ‘nation state to the member state’ (Bickerton 2012). The term regulatory state is apt; 
rather than seeing a bonfire of regulation and unrestrained market activities absent any 
oversight, we have instead seen a proliferation of governmental, non-government and quasi-
governmental agencies that are tasked with performing the oversight that may have once been 
the exclusive prerogative of the state (see, for example Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005, 7; 
Braithwaite 2008, 8; J. S. Wright 2011, 31). In the context of the EU, the origins of agency 
proliferation are not in the school of New Public Management, but with the outsourcing of 
Commission regulatory functions in order to achieve uniform solutions to regulatory policy 
problems (Dehousse 1997) and facilitate the development of common standards of behaviour 
and practice (Majone 1997). Rittberger and Wonka provide an additional explanation, namely 
the desire to ensure that regulatory functions are shielded from the political considerations 
that may arise in the college of Commissioners that may serve to undermine the credibility of 
regulation should it be subject to political rather than functional concerns (Rittberger and 
Wonka 2011; see also Wonka 2007). The Commission has defined EU agencies as ‘agencies 
required to be actively involved in exercising the executive function by enacting instruments 
which contribute to regulating a specific sector’ (European Commission 2002, 4), such as 
network and information security or aviation safety. For Chamon, the best way of 
categorising these agencies for the purposes of law is as permanent bodies established under 
EU public law through secondary legislation, endowed with legal personality (2016, 10). 
These bodies have historically been established on the basis of a belief that assigning 
regulatory powers to ostensibly independent bodies frees them from political interference and 
sector-based capture (Wonka and Rittberger 2010; Hix 1998, 40; a view also held by the 
Commission, as evidenced in European Commission 2002, 5).Furthermore, the creation of 
EU agencies allows for the development of expertise in light of the increasing complexity of 
regulation as a sphere of activity (Thatcher 2002, 131–32). The resulting agencies are legally 
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constituted, in most cases, under Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, hereafter TFEU (see generally Fahey 2011; Chamon 2016, 141–43). This is 
permitted by EU law as a means of ensuring horizontal harmonisation by enabling regulatory 
supervision, as stressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in a number of cases, 
which has reiterated the significant discretion of the EU to choose the most appropriate way 
of harmonising laws and functions, including through the establishment of EU agencies.1 
 
Mirroring developments in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (see generally 
Christensen and Lægreid 2007), the European Union has increasingly relied upon such 
agencies, beginning with the establishment of bodies such as the European Monitoring Centre 
on Drugs and Drug Addiction. This agency is tasked with creating and collating scientific 
evidence that the European Commission possessed neither the resources nor knowledge to 
attempt (Dehousse 1997, 252–53). These agencies are perceived to ‘contribute to technical 
and sectoral know-how […and] is one way for the Commission to control the implementation 
of community regulation […] as well as securing expertise, credibility and visibility’ 
(Trondal and Jeppesen 2008, 417–18). For the European Commission, ‘the creation of further 
autonomous EU agencies in clearly defined areas will improve the way rules are applied and 
enforced across the Union’ (2001, 23). With an emphasis on output legitimacy based in the 
high quality of technical evaluations and decisions (Borrás, Koutalakis, and Wendler 2007, 
586), as of 2015 there are32 EUagencies which combine executive and quasi-regulatory 
functions (Egeberg, Trondal, and Vestlund 2015, 615). Regardless of concerns regarding both 
input legitimacy (Borrás, Koutalakis, and Wendler 2007), the accountability (Busuioc 2009), 
                                                     
1 Cases C-359/92 Federal Republic of Germany v Council (Product Safety) EU:C:1994:306; C-66/04 United 
Kingdom v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Smoke Flavourings) EU:C:2005:743; 
C-217/04 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (ENISA) 
EU:C:2006:279; Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
(EMSA) EU:C:2014:18; Case-358/14 Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
(Tobacco Products Directive) EU:C:2016:323 
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and independence (Arras and Braun 2017) of these agencies (topics of importance but 
ultimately outside the scope of this paper), they have become part of the EU’s regulatory 
environment, or in the Commission’s words, ‘part of the institutional landscape’ (2008, 2). 
These bodies typify what Black typifies as a ‘polycentric’ regulatory regime, comprising both 
national regulators and local, national and transnational private actors who are all engaged in 
the activities of that agency (2008, 140). While the EU agencies themselves are public 
bodies, they act as central nodes for a decentralised governance regime in which the line 
between state and non-state, or public and private, have been blurred, both in the realm of 
security governance and in the composition of EU agencies more generally (Shearing and 
Wood 2003). 
 
The purpose of these agencies, as touched upon briefly above, is to gather and assess data, 
developing expert knowledge that the EU’s organs such as the Commission or Council may 
not have the capacity or resources to develop (Majone 2000; Thatcher 2002), but can 
nevertheless rely upon in law and policy-making. According to Cardwell, the key to the 
success of these agencies is in their ability to facilitate regulatory networks, bringing together 
various national agency representatives, experts, and private stakeholders (2013, 541), 
helping to ‘support the decision-making process by pooling the technical or specialist 
expertise available at European and national level’ (European Commission 2008, 2), and 
thereby necessitating their hybrid, networked structure. Operating in diverse sectors, from 
food to aviation safety, to banking oversight, to border integrity and cyber-security, these 
agencies serve to bolster the credibility of the EU’s policy actions in fields of technical 
complexity (Wonka and Rittberger 2010, 734–36). Non-state stakeholders are represented in 
more than three-quarters of EU agencies (Arras and Braun 2017, 2), based on the 
understanding that these stakeholders possess expert knowledge, and are therefore best 
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placed to contribute towards an effective and efficient regulatory system (see Maggetti and 
Verhoest 2014; Rittberger and Wonka 2011). In no field is this perhaps more apparent than in 
the management of risk and security. According to Bures and Carrapico (2017) the 
involvement of private actors in mediating security threats has moved beyond the selling of 
security services by private military security companies (for more on this topic see 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Webber et al. 2004) to non-security sector actors taking an 
active role in ensuring the safety of the critical infrastructure they own, be it health care 
facilities, national electricity grids or banking systems (O’Rourke 2007). This has extended to 
private sector actors with knowledge of a particular sector being drawn into the regulatory 
sphere, going beyond the ‘mere’ enforcement of state-based regulatory standards (see for 
example Braithwaite 2008; Levi-Faur 2005) to the active development of those standards 
through participation in EU agencies. One such example is the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA, which is due to be renamed the European Union 
Agency for Cybersecurity, subject to the European Parliament’s approval of the proposed EU 
Cybersecurity Regulation (2017)) in which private sector actors representing Internet and 
online service providers have worked together with national agencies under the auspices of 
ENISA to develop standards for the protection of network and information system security 
through identification of best practices, benchmarking of national NIS policies and 
compliance with international standards (Carrapico and Farrand 2017). This more informal, 
network form of governance became increasingly formalised, both through the EU’s 2013 
Cyber-Security Strategy, which reiterated the importance of the involvement of private sector 
actors in EU agencies (European Commission and High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013, 6) and the resulting Network and 
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Information Security Directive (Directive 2016/1148), which codified the practices and role 
of ENISA and private sector actors in ensuring network and information security.2 
 
In the context of the EU and Brexit, as will be discussed in further detail later in this article, 
one of the ostensible aims of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is to ‘take back control’ of 
public policy, including control over customs and trade. However, as subsequent sections will 
demonstrate, the policy problem of counterfeiting (and its link to customs) is one that 
transcends national boundaries, and indeed the capacity of national authorities to effectively 
counter this form of criminal activity. As such, unlinking these issues of security and 
transnational threats from the EU agencies tasked with confronting them is exceedingly 
difficult. The development of a concerted regional approach to combatting the sale and 
dissemination of counterfeit goods will be looked at as an example of agency building, and 
how the resulting structures of the European Observatory under the auspices of the EUIPO 
have been essential to the development of operational expertise and critical information 
repositories and datasets.  Regrettably, as will be shown, this is information that the UK is not 
effectively positioned to reproduce at a national level post-Brexit.  
 
3: Regulating Counterfeiting: The Limits of Law and the Advantage of Agencies 
 
In this section, we will explore the phenomenon of counterfeiting in more detail, identifying 
its links to other forms of criminal activity, the difficulties in controlling counterfeiting 
without coordinated regional action, and the development of a formalised agency structure as 
a means of more effectively regulating this security risk.  Counterfeiting, and subsequently 
                                                     
2 Directive 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security for network and 
information systems across the Union 
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the laws and policies of the EU concerning this phenomenon, lies at the nexus between the 
EU’s activities as an economic actor and as a security one – in this way, the combatting of 
counterfeits is a goal that links the functioning of the internal market and external trade 
relations to the realisation of the AFSJ. It concerns both intellectual property and consumer 
protection, subjects ordinarily considered as falling within the domain of civil law, and 
criminal activities both organised and opportunistic, and the blurring divide between internal 
and external security. The Commission has commented that ‘counterfeiting and piracy, which 
were once craft activities, have become almost industrial-scale activities. They offer 
criminals the prospect of large economic profit without excessive risk’ (European 
Commission 2003b, 12). Not only do counterfeit goods free-ride upon the reputation of 
legitimate sellers, potentially depriving them of revenue and creating profits for illegal 
operators, but in certain markets, such as those for counterfeit cigarettes and medicines the 
actors involved in distribution are part of organised crime groups such as the Italian 
‘Ndrangheta, (Calderoni et al. 2014) as well as groups affiliated with religious and political 
extremism (Spink 2017). Producers of these goods are often involved in other criminal 
activities, particularly those originating in China (the main source of counterfeit goods in the 
EU), where the production is often overseen by organised criminals also involved in other 
activities such as narcotic distribution, illegal gambling and prostitution (see for example 
Shen and Antonopoulos 2017, 273; Europol and Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal 
Market 2015, 4). Furthermore, counterfeit products do not only pose the threat of economic 
harm, but also real and serious physical harm, whether from fake medicines and cosmetics 
containing toxic ingredients (Lavorgna 2015; Europol and Office for the Harmonisation of 
the Internal Market 2015), to faulty electronics (Stephan 2016) and badly made airplane parts 
(Lash 2005). According to Europol’s ‘Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment’ 
(SOCTA) report from 2013, 28.6% of all goods seized at EU borders constituted counterfeit 
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goods posing a direct risk to health and safety, covering ‘foods and beverages, body care 
articles, medicines, electrical household items and toys’ (2013, 22). For this reason, 
counterfeiting (which should be distinguished from copyright infringement in the form of 
piracy as discussed in Farrand and Carrapico 2012) is considered to present a security threat, 
both in terms of the threat to personal health and safety that faulty and fake goods present, as 
well as its link to the financing of other forms of serious crime, serving as an example of the 
crime-terror nexus (Sullivan et al. 2014; Carrapico, Irrera, and Tupman 2014). 
 
Policies targeting counterfeiting in the European Union began to be discussed in the 1980s. In 
1985, the Commission published a proposal for a Regulation intended to combat 
counterfeiting (European Commission 1984), defining counterfeit goods as ‘any goods 
bearing without authorisation a trade mark registered in accordance with Community law or 
the law of a Member State in which the goods are entered for free circulation’ (European 
Commission 1984 Article 1(2)). The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens Rights drafted a report in support of the Commission’s action, noting that 
counterfeiting constituted a ‘jargon’ term, covering the making and/or selling of products 
similar to well-known products on the market, with the mark or name of the manufacturer of 
the original goods (European Parliament 1985, 13). What is readily evident is that since its 
first treatment in EU policy documents, counterfeiting has been perceived as an external 
problem with internal effects; the final Regulation (3842/86) as adopted emphasising in its 
recital paragraphs the focus on the importation of counterfeit goods from third countries into 
the (then) Community and need for effective customs enforcement as a means of identifying 
and seizing counterfeit goods, so as to prevent the considerable negative impact upon 
legitimate traders and consumers. The threat of counterfeit goods arises elsewhere, in third 
states, but the damage is felt, as Piatti argues ‘in the national or “natural” markets of the 
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proprietor of the registered trade mark’, namely the (now) EU (1989, 241). Waves of 
successive legislation3 and academic commentary have demonstrated that this perception has 
not been ameliorated by time, but instead reinforced, as the realisation of complex global 
supply chains and increased trade between nations increases the likelihood of the 
establishment of new markets for counterfeit goods, new products to be the subject of 
counterfeiting, and new networks for their production and distribution, making the 
identification of counterfeit goods, the scale and effects of the problem, and the transit routes 
for these goods difficult to achieve (European Commission 1998, 10, 2003a, 2; Council of the 
European Union 2003, 16). 
 
Indeed, it was this inability to effectively counter the effects of counterfeiting on the EU’s 
internal market that led to the establishment of the European Observatory on Counterfeiting 
and Piracy under the auspices of the European Commission’s Internal Market and Services 
Directorate-General in 2009. In 2008, the Council of the European Union published 
Conclusions on counterfeiting and piracy, in which it stated that it observed the ‘seriousness 
and the worrying growth of the phenomenon of counterfeiting and piracy […and was] aware 
of the scale of this phenomenon on the Internet too’ (2008, para. 10). In its Conclusions, the 
Council emphasised the need to ‘mobilise all stakeholders to boost the effectiveness of the 
whole range of instruments for protecting intellectual property and combating counterfeiting 
and piracy on the internal market and internationally’ (2008, para. 13), and recommended 
amongst a range of actions, the establishment of an observatory comprising public and 
                                                     
3 Regulation 3842/86 was very quickly replaced by Regulation 3295/94 laying down measures to 
prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export, or entry for a suspensive procedures of 
counterfeit and pirated goods, which was amended several times, the last amendment of which was by 
amending Regulation 806/2003.  This Regulation was then repealed, and replaced by Regulation 
1383/2003 concerning customs actions against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual 
property rights and measures to be taken against goods found to have infringed such rights, which was 
then repealed and replaced by Regulation 608/2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003. 
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private sectors working together to better identify the extent of the phenomena (2008, para. 
15). In response, the Commission published an Action Plan in 2009, stating that 
‘consolidating public and private sector partnerships is also imperative to […making…] IPR 
enforcement work better, […] by complementing legislation with a range of non-legislative 
measures’ (2009, 4–5). The desire to facilitate this public-private collaboration was in part 
influenced by a 2006 OECD study, which indicated that ‘available information on 
counterfeiting and piracy falls far short of what is needed for robust analysis and for 
policymaking’ (2006, 171), due to differences in rates of national reporting and lack of 
effective sharing of information, making the magnitude and effect of counterfeiting difficult 
to establish. Furthermore, the OECD study reported deficiencies in enforcement, arising from 
the same lack of cooperation, arguing that  
 
Industry has an important role to play […] as it has the experience and knowledge to 
efficiently complement government action. Its involvement in the enforcement effort 
is essential since: 1) rights holders have the technical expertise to distinguish 
counterfeits from original products; and 2) industry may have additional information 
regarding the functioning of distribution channels. (2006, 191) 
 
The Observatory serves to remedy these defects in economic evidence and operational 
strategy that are perceived to hinder enforcement processes, with the Commission stating that 
it would constitute a ‘platform for representatives from national authorities and stakeholders 
to exchange ideas and expertise on best practices, to develop joint enforcement strategies and 
to make recommendations to policy-makers’ (European Commission 2009, 6). However, 
while considering the work of the Observatory vital, the Commission acknowledged that the 
structure of the Observatory, and its position as a sub-division within DG Internal Market and 
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Services was inherently limiting; on this basis, the Commission proposed transferring the 
expertise of the Observatory to the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market 
(OHIM), allowing it to have access to additional expertise, resources and financing, as well 
as expanding its remit (2011d, 4–5). Having identified some of the key difficulties in 
combatting counterfeiting as being the lack of reliable data, insufficient coordination and 
exchange between authorities in the Member States of best practice, insufficient exchange of 
information between private sector experts and a lack of expertise on the part of those 
involved in intellectual property enforcement (European Commission 2011b, 7–11), the 
Commission concluded that in order to ensure a ‘critical mass’ of expertise, rather than 
establish the Observatory as an entirely new agency, merging its activities with those of 
OHIM would be the preferred option. As well as the somewhat more pedestrian justification 
of reducing costs, doing so would allow for the work of the Observatory to be more efficient, 
combining OHIM’s already existing expertise and coordination networks in the fields of 
trade mark and design enforcement with the developing networks and expertise in 
counterfeiting of the Observatory (European Commission 2011b, 33). This subsuming of the 
Observatory into OHIM’s structure was completed by Regulation 386/2012, renaming it the 
European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights, and providing a clear 
outline of the Observatory’s activities under Article 2(2), mandating that it should meet with 
public and private stakeholders at least once a year under Article 4(1), as well as 
complementing those activities with additional working group meetings made up of public 
officials and private sector experts under Article 4(4). As of 2015, OHIM was renamed the 
European Union Intellectual Property Office as a result of the changes introduced by 
Regulation 2015/2424. Ironically, the Commission expressed reservations regarding the 
change of the name, stating that while it would accept it, ‘it is regrettable that the new name 
does not represent the actual core activity and does not adequately reflect the fact that the 
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"Office" is an "agency" of the EU’ (2015, 3). As an additional note, the renaming of the 
EUIPO did not follow the guidance of the European Parliament, Commission and Council on 
the naming of EU agencies provided in the 2012 Common Approach on EU decentralised 
agencies, which stated that all future agencies should use the standard naming convention of 
‘European Union agency for…’ (2012, 3). Nevertheless, with this new legal underpinning, 
the Observatory was in a position to foster larger networks of expertise and identification of 
best practices in combatting counterfeiting.  
 
According to an Impact Assessment (2011a) accompanying a Proposal for a Regulation on 
customs enforcement that would replace the 2003 Regulation (2011c), the Commission was 
clear that the work of the European Observatory had informed its approach to regulation in 
this field; reiterating that valuable data collection, gathering of expertise and identification of 
best practice that the Observatory had already achieved by 2011, it concluded that the 
training of customs officials would take place under the auspices of the Observatory 
(European Commission 2011a, 47). Stressing the importance of the Observatory’s work in 
‘improving the collection and use of information and data; promoting and spreading best 
practice amongst public authorities, spreading successful private sector strategies and raising  
public awareness’ (European Commission 2011a, 48), the finalised 2013 Regulation states in 
recital 20 that ‘Customs authorities and the Commission are encouraged to cooperate with the 
European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights in the framework of 
their respective competences’. The cooperation of these customs officials, both with each 
other, and in the context of the Observatory, is ultimately based upon existing relationships of 
trust, and facilitated through formalisation of agency connections. The facilitation of a 
coordination, cooperation and information-exchange network was dependent upon the pre-
existence of networks of cooperation developed in the context of the EUIPO and served as 
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one of the justifications for it being constituted there rather than as an entirely new agency.  
Yet what happens when these networked connections are in some way severed?  This shall be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
4: From Member of the Club to Untrustworthy Neighbour: What happens in the 
absence of agency cooperation in the field of counterfeiting? 
 
In this penultimate section, we will consider the growing threat posed by counterfeiting, 
particularly in the context of the online sale of counterfeit goods, and use the case study of 
the UK’s exiting of the EU to demonstrate the vital nature that these agencies play.  
According to the OECD, in 2016, ‘the share of small shipments, mostly by post or express 
services, keeps growing due to the shrinking cost of such modes of transport and the 
increasing importance of Internet and e-commerce in international trade’ (2016, 82). In order 
to effectively identify goods likely to be counterfeit, as well as likely shipping methods, 
transit routes and packaging types (making identification of small consignments easier, if not 
necessarily easy), the Observatory has worked with public and private stakeholders in a trust 
relationship to develop a series of databases, accessible only to national authorities in the EU, 
EU-based policy-makers, and EU-based companies. The first of these databases is ACIST, 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Intelligence Support Tool, which provides information on the 
counterfeited and pirated goods detained at all EU Member States' borders. ACIST does 
provide some general information to all users of the website, but more specific data on items 
seized at the EU’s borders, as well as the number of cases and detention rates is only 
available to national authorities, EU agencies and EU-based private companies registered for 
use of the service. Similarly, ACRIS, the Anti-Counterfeiting Rapid Intelligence System is 
accessible only by EU-based companies affected by IP infringements in countries outside the 
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EU and information on the respective follow-up of these cases by local authorities. In order 
to access the information stored, an account must be requested, which is then reviewed and 
approved by the EUIPO. Finally, the EDB, or Enforcement Database, can only be accessed 
by IPR right-holders and national enforcement authorities, upon specific request to the 
Observatory, which will then determine whether the request can be approved. The purpose of 
this database is to collect information on IPRs likely to be affected by counterfeiting, 
including packaging, photos of the product as well as other logistic information, so as to 
assist law enforcement in identifying fakes. In this respect, the creation of EU agencies has 
been essential to the development of the information systems required to ensure that anti-
counterfeiting activities can be effectively carried out. 
 
What does this mean for the UK upon its withdrawal from the EU? The first thing to bear in 
mind is that when the UK leaves, it is highly likely that it will cease to be able to fully take 
part in the EU agencies, particularly in the event that the UK leaves without any formal 
agreement with the EU. This looks increasingly likely, given the recent vote to accept the 
Withdrawal Agreement with the EU was rejected in the House of Commons in one of the 
biggest governmental defeats in parliamentary history. Firstly, Regulations will cease to have 
effect in the UK post-Brexit.  Regulations have general application to Member States under 
Article 288 TFEU, which will of course mean that there will be substantial gaps in the UK 
legal order as a result of withdrawal, in fields such as customs (Łazowski 2016, 1298), as 
well as intellectual property rights. The legal basis for the establishment of the EUIPO and 
indeed the EU trade mark under Regulation 2017/1001 is Article 118 TFEU (European 
Commission 2013, 5), which allows for the establishment of centralised Union-wide 
authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements for the uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights in the EU, so as to ensure the functioning of the internal market. It 
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would appear, then, to make little sense that the UK would leave the single market and yet 
remain part of the EU trade mark and EUIPO. That the UK will no longer be part of this 
system of trade mark protection is evident from the EU’s draft Withdrawal Agreement, which 
states in Article 50(1)(a) that the holder of an EU trade mark will automatically become the 
holder of a national trade mark in the UK. In terms of agencies, the UK’s decision to initiate 
the Article 50 procedure resulted in the relocation of the UK-based EU agencies, on the basis 
that if you are not a Member State of the EU, you are no longer part of its institutional 
structure, which includes its agencies. The UK has sought to argue that it will be able to 
continue its membership of certain agencies, including Europol, subsequent to its withdrawal 
(EUobserver 2017; Chazan and Bond 2018). However, to do would ultimately require that 
the UK attain a working arrangement4 similar to that of Norway or the US, which is 
negotiated on a bilateral basis. As the House of Lords European Select Committee made 
clear, however, this process is highly technical and negotiations are lengthy, ‘being measured 
in years, not months’ (2016, para. 52). It must also be stated that while Europol is legally 
permitted to enter into working arrangements, under Article 23(1) of the Europol Regulation 
(2016/794), which allows it to establish and maintain cooperative relations with the 
authorities of third countries, international organisations and private parties. In comparison, 
however, Regulation 2017/1001 provides for no equivalent powers for the EUIPO, and at the 
time of writing, there are no countries that have ‘partner’ status or associate membership of 
the EUIPO. For this reason, upon withdrawing from the EU, it is probable that the UK will 
have not be a member of, and indeed will have no formal legal access to, the EUIPO. This 
also entails loss of access to the Observatory and the ACIST, ACRIS and EDB systems. Had 
                                                     
4 Prior to 2016, Europol was able to enter into cooperation and strategic agreements with third states.  
However, with Regulation 2016/794, while all previous agreements continue to have force under Article 
25(1)(c).  Under Article 23(1), the new form of cooperation is in the form of an ‘arrangement’, which is 
concluded not with a state, but with that state’s relevant authorities.  It is also worth noting that under 
this Regulation, Europol’s full name changed to the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation, demonstrating that the EUIPO could have also stuck to the new naming convention. 
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the House of Commons accepted the Withdrawal Agreement, access to these databases may 
have been facilitated under Article 8 of the Agreement for the duration of the transition 
period, but this does not appear to be likely now. This will leave the UK in a position where it 
loses access to valuable operational and strategic data, information on trends and trade routes 
for counterfeit goods, and participation expert group meetings concerning the identification 
of best practices in combating counterfeiting. This is not information the UK possesses, nor 
which it is able to effectively develop at the national level, due in no small part to the global 
and diffuse nature of counterfeiting as a public policy problem. For Member States that have 
been reliant upon EU agencies as a central node in regulatory networks, as well as sources of 
information, the loss of access implied has grave repercussions on the ability of the state to 
manage its security against the types of threats that these transnational networks were created 
to counter. 
 
Furthermore, the ability of the UK to govern its own customs borders are also likely to raise 
concerns for the EU. Could it be that the UK is badly equipped to police the transit of 
counterfeit goods in the absence of the protections afforded by being part of the Customs 
Union? Leaving aside completely many of the legal, social, political, cultural and historical 
headaches that the Northern Ireland-Ireland border represents, which increasingly seem to be 
problems without solutions (for a non-exhaustive list of problems identified, ranging from 
immigration to labour to cross-border purchases see Birrell and Gray 2017; Braniff and 
Whiting 2017; Hayward, Campbell, and Murphy 2017; Soares 2016), the UK’s ability to 
manage the import of counterfeit goods into the UK appears to be somewhat limited, with 
repercussions for the EU. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the largest 
increases in the movement of counterfeit goods is through small consignment (defined as 
postal or express courier consignments that contain three units or less or which weigh less 
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than two kilogrammes under Article 2(19) of Regulation 608/2013), constituting 70% of 
cases of seized counterfeit goods (Europol and European Union Intellectual Property Office 
2017, 13). Most of these consignments are facilitated by Internet-based transactions, where 
the supplier is based outside of the EU and sells directly online to an end user based in the 
EU, minimising risk for the seller and making identification of these goods in transit 
incredibly difficult (see Farrand 2018, 8; see also Schneider and Maillefer 2015; Treadwell 
2012). Consider then the problem of the Northern Ireland border. For historical reasons, 
having a hard border between the UK (i.e. Northern Ireland) and Ireland is politically 
infeasible. For this reason, the EU has demanded that the UK impose no hard border, instead 
creating something of a maritime border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK for 
the purposes of customs enforcement, with Northern Ireland ‘considered part of the customs 
territory of the Union’ under Article 4(2) of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, EU-UK 
Withdrawal Agreement. This has been deemed politically unacceptable to the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland, which has publicly stated that it would not accept 
the imposition of a ‘border’ between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK (Bell 2017), and 
played a major part in the House of Commons rejecting the Withdrawal Agreement.  
 
UK proposals on how customs enforcement would work on this basis, including the 
possibility of ‘creative solutions’ based upon new technologies (see HM Government 2017) 
have been dismissed by the EU (O. Wright and Coates 2018), as well as technology experts 
who have described the proposal as fanciful and unworkable. In a House of Commons 
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee hearing in March 2018, it was concluded that the 
technologies that the UK government had referred to are ‘still in their infancy and require 
commercial goods vehicles to cross the border line at designated customs posts. Both Norway 
and Switzerland also apply Single Market rules which obviates the need for regulatory 
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compliance checks’ (2018, 28), meaning that even states using these types of technology rely 
upon a level of regulatory convergence with the EU that the UK government has declared 
politically unacceptable. If we leave aside haulage to consider only individuals travelling 
across the border with small consignments ordered from the Internet, then counterfeit goods 
may arrive in the UK, and then be transferred to Northern Ireland for transport by individuals 
into the Ireland, meaning that the UK becomes a transit route for counterfeit goods, rather 
than just a potential destination. There may be little confidence in the UK being able to 
effectively monitor the transfer of individual consignments and seize counterfeit goods 
moving across this border without the imposition of hard border controls already deemed 
politically unacceptable to both sides in the negotiations. This will be of particular concern 
when considering markets for counterfeit pharmaceuticals – the UK has been a target country 
for producers of fake medicines, the majority of which are based in China and India and have 
key transit routes such as Hong Kong (OECD and European Observatory on Infringements of 
Intellectual Property Rights 2017, 35), in part due to reasons of historical ties. The 
Observatory and Europol have found that UK customs have seized the highest percentage of 
fake medicines in the EU at 24% of all seizures, despite only have 11% of overall legitimate 
trade in pharmaceuticals, and is considered a ‘high risk’ country (Europol and European 
Union Intellectual Property Office 2017, 72). Only Bulgaria had a higher rate of seizure 
compared to legitimate imports, with Europol concluding that this was potentially due to it 
being an attempted point of entry to the EU for this type of product (2017, 72). In 
comparison, Ireland, which borders the UK, is considered a ‘very low risk’ country for 
counterfeit medicine entry into the EU (2017, 71). With the UK leaving the EU, the 
possibility for the EU is that a Member State previously considered a high-risk point of entry 
becomes a high risk third country of transit. Pharmaceuticals could either be mailed to 
intermediaries in the UK or arrive in large consignments at UK ports. Given concerns over 
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the ability of the UK to manage the number of imports received at Dover, with a need for 
more than 5,000 more customs staff (Acton 2017), and belief on the part of the UK Trade 
Facilitation Expert Panel that an effective customs management system will not be in place 
until 2025 (Blitz 2017), the UK could then become a key regional hub during this time of 
uncertainty for counterfeit pharmaceuticals. If for reasons of political infeasibility the 
customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK is a ‘soft’ border, so as to 
not enflame tensions in Northern Ireland, these medicines could then be transported to 
Northern Ireland and thereby enter the customs area of the EU, with the possibility of those 
goods then being either transferred by road to Ireland, or otherwise shipped to other countries 
in the EU. The combination of the UK’s loss of access to the European Observatory, and with 
it operational expertise, coupled with concerns over future capacity to act in the absence of 
knowledge of counterfeiting trends facilitated through access to databases such as ACIST is 
likely to result in the UK being regarded not as a security partner in combating counterfeit 
goods, but instead as an untrustworthy neighbour, a transit route for unsafe goods, and a 
vulnerable entry point to the Customs Union. What makes the UK more insecure through loss 
of EU agency expertise may serve to make the EU more insecure by extension. 
 
5: Conclusion: The Importance of Agency Expertise in Combatting Security Threats 
 
As this article has sought to demonstrate, effective regulation in areas of technical complexity 
is dependent upon effective cooperation between public and private sectors across borders, 
particularly when seeking to manage issues of security such as the trade in counterfeit goods 
posing threats to human health and safety. Yet this cooperation necessitates parties have 
formal governance structures to facilitate this cooperation, such as through EU agencies. In 
the field of anti-counterfeiting policies in intellectual property law enforcement, the role of 
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the EUIPO and European Observatory in facilitating networks of cooperation allowing for 
the sharing of operational information and technical expertise has been essential in providing 
valuable data on counterfeiting trends, risks and transit routes, as well as establishing best 
practices in identifying and seizing counterfeit goods and bringing cases to trial in front of an 
informed judiciary. In this way, the development of effective anti-counterfeiting policies and 
activities cannot have taken place without the creation of EU agencies facilitating these forms 
of coordination and cooperation. A single state, even an EU Member State or state with 
approximated laws on counterfeit goods simply lacks the information and capacity to deal 
with counterfeiting as a multi-faceted security threat. Particularly in the case of a state such 
as the UK, which already relies upon these agencies and the information they possess, it is 
exceedingly difficult to see how they can operate as an individual state without severely 
impacting the effectiveness of their customs enforcement. In the hypothetical example 
provided, the UK risks becoming perceived as unreliable both in terms of its capacity and its 
capability to prevent the importation of counterfeit goods.  This presents a potential security 
risk to the EU’s AFSJ as the UK becomes a possible transit route for unsafe consumer 
products.  More generally, this article has demonstrated that agency relationships provide a 
wealth of information and operational expertise, allowing for greater capacities for actionon 
the part of national authorities, and that as states become more dependent upon these 
agencies, there is considerable potential for serious and unforeseen consequences should 
those agency relations cease.  In areas of significant complexity, whether in the field of 
intellectual property protection, or in other fields such as cyber-security, medicines approval 
or food safety, very local problems are often the result of very global activities.  Their 
solutions, by necessity, must also be global, or as the saying goes, ‘Alone we can do so little; 
together we can do so much’. 
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